Break the chain, spoil the load: a handling-condition ledger that travels with a sensitive payload across every agent hop and grades it CLEAN, GRADED, or SPOILED on excursion - not on trust.
A sensitive payload - credentials in use, personal data, licensed material, a principal's confidential corpus - loses its value the way a vaccine loses potency: by handling excursions invisible in the delivered result. At origination the payload is sealed with a machine-readable condition envelope (permitted custodian classes, stores, jurisdictions and contexts, encryption and no-plaintext terms, per-hop and total retention bounds, tolerance and spoilage thresholds) whose id is a hash of its contents. Every custodian receives custody only by extending the hash-chained, signed travelling logger - signature as the price of custody; a refusal breaks the chain visibly and the signed break is witnessed into the record. At receipt a pre-posted spoilage rule grades the journey mechanically on an excursion integral in sensitivity-minutes (magnitude x duration x payload sensitivity, localised per custodian, with chain-level excess allocated chronologically): CLEAN, GRADED within tolerance, GRADED with claim contributors named, or SPOILED with the spoiling custodian named. Grades accumulate into cross-chain custodian standing.
Prices: $2.49 per sealed payload (envelope + travelling logger + excursion grade at receipt) - Chain Pass $99 per 100 sealed payloads - Custodian Attestation $9.99/tool/mo (10,000 logger extensions/mo included, stated allowance; further extensions $0.50 per 1,000) - Fleet Pass $19.99/operator/mo (200 sealed payloads/mo included, stated allowance - never unlimited). One free sealed payload per operator, once, ever.
Stated plainly: Every grade leg is labelled VERIFIABLE or ATTESTED. ATTESTED terms (plaintext logging, copies, contexts, encryption, jurisdiction) rest on the custodian's signed attestation; the service does not claim to detect off-record mishandling from the logger alone. A bare hash chain verifies any clean prefix, so tail truncation is undetectable without an expected sequence: every production envelope posts either an expected_custodians sequence or a final-custodian delivery-receipt requirement, and origination refuses an envelope with neither. The market is bounded to chains whose custodians can be required to sign. Mishandling frequency and willingness to pay are UNMEASURED.
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